PUBLIC SCHOOLS' PYRRHIC VICTORIES OVER
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Michael Farris* & Bradley P. Jacob**

Their string of courtroom wins is indeed impressive. Public schools
have been uniformly successful in beating back the legal claims of parents
seeking a meaningful role in decisions concerning their own children's
education -- so much so that two expert commentators, Professors Uerling
and Strope, presented a session at the Education Law Association's 1997
annual meeting entitled: The Parental Right to Direct Their Child's
Education in a Public School Setting.-As An Evolving Matter It Is Almost
Extinct.1
Many within the public school establishment dance within
unrestrained enthusiasm on the grave of parental rights. But, we
respectfully submit, they celebrate a pyrrhic victory. Left unremedied, the
defeat of parents' rights in this context would prove not only harmful for
parents and students, but would also damage public schooling in two
interconnected ways.
First, when court decisions effectively shut out parents who want to
have a meaningful say in their children's education, they will often choose
to remove their children from the public schools. These parents will
instead look to alternative forms of education which respect their desires
and their rights. The number of students in private education, including
home schooling, continues to increase dramatically.2 Home schooling, an
insignificant component of our nation's educational mix as recently as the
1980s, has grown so rapidly that as of 1996, the number of home schooled
students nationwide stood at 1.23 million -- comparable to the number of
public school pupils in either Georgia or New Jersey, and more than the
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but the same points about the availability of school choice and the incentives for parents
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total number of public school students in the states of Wyoming, Vermont,
Delaware, North and South Dakota, Alaska, Rhode Island, Montana and
Hawaii combined.3 Setbacks in parental rights fuel the desire for an even
greater variety of educational choices, including charter schools, vouchers,
and tuition tax credits. Every time parents' rights are diminished -whether in a local school board skirmish or a published decision of a
United States Court of Appeals -- a greater number of families become
determined to take their own money, their tax money, and their children to
non-public schools.
Second, the public schools' victories over parental rights serve to
diminish the quality of American public education. Overwhelming
evidence demonstrates that one of the greatest predictors for a child's4
educational success in any school environment is parental involvement.
Indeed, public educators themselves routinely affirm the overwhelming
importance of active parental participation in the educational process.
According to one recent survey, 83% of public school teachers (95% in
inner-city schools) would like to see the level of parental involvement in
their schools increase 5 However, the survey also revealed that when
teachers were asked how this involvement should be demonstrated, the
majority did not want parents to play a role in curriculum changes or
homework policy; instead, 96% found it6 valuable for parents to act as
promoters and fundraisers for the schools.
Schools' legal victories over parents who want real involvement in
their children's education, not just raising money, have a chilling effect on
the parents who remain in the public school system. As a consequence,
there grows a greater "involvement gap" between private and public
education resulting in an even greater "achievement gap." Not only do the
schools lose the students who transfer to other educational venues, but the
students who do remain lose the benefit of improved education that results
from active involvement of concerned parents in the educational process.
In our litigious culture, it is often assumed that a win in the courtroom
is a cause for rejoicing. However, it is essential that those who care about
3 Brian D. Ray, Ph.D., Home Education Across the United States, National Home

Education Research Institute, Salem, Oregon, 1997, 2-3.
4 There are many studies and reports confirming this intuitively-obvious point. See, e.g.,
U.S House of Representatives Committee on Education and the Workforce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Education at a Crossroads: What Works
and What's Wasted in Education Today, Chairman's Report Draft July 1998, 42-51
("Parents Involved in Their Children's Education"); William J. Bennett, Secretary, What
Works: Research About Teaching and Learning, U.S. Department of Education, 2d ed.
1987, 17 (including citations to original sources).
5 See Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., The Metropolitan Life Survey of the American
Teacher, 1998, Building Family-School Partnerships: Views of Teachers and Students
53-55
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the long-term success of the public schools -- a concern shared by these
authors -- be engaged in a thoughtful assessment of whether the victories
of schools over parents' rights are worth the cost.
The erosion of parental rights in the context of public education is due
in no small part to the apparent apathy of the Supreme Court. Despite its
sweeping pronouncements declaring the "right of parents to direct the
education of their children" to be a fundamental right of the highest
magnitude, 7 the Supreme Court has never decided even a single case
involving that right within the context of public education. 8 The Court's
silence on the topic seems to be deliberate, since there has been no
shortage of cases seeking review which would have required a
determination by the Court of the breadth of parents' rights once their
child has entered the doors of a public school. 9
7 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)

("The Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees the right of the individual . . . to establish a home and bring up children");
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925) ("the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children ....
The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right and
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations"); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972) ("The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
'essential'); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("This case involves the
fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the state, to guide the religious
future and education of their children . . . . This primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate"); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the 14th Amendment"); Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) ("We have long held that there exists a 'private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter"').
8 The Court's decisions regarding the rights of persons in the public education arena fall
primarily into three main categories:
(a) Establishment Clause cases which establish the right to be free
from even a hint of school-sponsored or teacher-encouraged
religion in the public schools, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980);
(b) Cases which define the rights of students in the public schools,
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990); and
(c) Cases which prohibit racial discrimination within the public
schools, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
9 See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education, 89 F.3d 174 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, U.S.
, 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer
Productions, 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996); Mozert v.

This article explores the historical roots of parental rights in education,
and then demonstrates that Professors Uerling and Strope are quite correct
when they declare parental rights in public education to be "almost
extinct." Next, it examines the stark contrasts between the rights of public
school parents and those of parents who choose private and home
schooling. Finally, this article suggests that since the constitutionality of
educational choice, including choices involving religious schools, has
been established beyond any legitimate question, public school advocates
and courts should rethink their position concerning parental rights within
public education lest they contribute to the demise of the very system
which they seek to save from the "subversive" influence of those
committed parents who give both students and tax dollars to the schools.
Parental Rights in Education: Pierce and its Progeny
Most parental rights in education cases -- including those with a Free
Exercise Clause component -- involve parents seeking an alternative for
their own child which differs from a rule of general applicability
controlling the education of other children. The Supreme Court doctrine
which ostensibly controls this area of law is predicated on two decisions -one of them old (twenty-six years) and the other very old (seventy-three
years).
Almost no other area of constitutional law depends on a decision from
the 1920s for its most important doctrinal pronouncement. Parental rights
advocates necessarily place nearly singular reliance on Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), for the Supreme Court's articulation of their
theory. Only Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), has added any
material weight to the theory in the past three-quarters of a century. And,
despite the revisionist dicta of Justice Scalia in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881
(1990), Yoder was primarily
a free exercise of religion case, with a thin
0
overlay.'
parental rights
Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1066 (1988); Grove v. Mead School District No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth, 420
Mass. 749, 652 N.E.2d 580 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996); Citizens for
Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Board of Education, 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1st Dist. 1975), appeal dismissedfor want of substantialfederal question, 425
U.S. 908 (1976), reh'g.denied,425 U.S. 1000 (1976).
10See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15. Cf Dept. Of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881 (1990) (Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the judgment in Smith, which
criticizes the majority's interpretation of Yoder and other so-called "hybrid rights" cases).
It is clear that the Yoder Court viewed its decision as compelled by the Free Exercise
Clause:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance
beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes
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Given Employment Division v. Smith's evisceration of the Free

Exercise Clause as a stand-alone source of protection from generallyapplicable governmental rules that violate religious conscience, Pierce is
of even greater significance." In Pierce, the Governor of Oregon
defended his state's rule of general applicability -- that all children must
attend public schools -- by defining the question with reference to a group

of cases concerning the right of parents to make curriculum choices for
their own children within the public schools.

The exact question involved in the present case has never
been passed upon by any American court. Perhaps the
cases which come the nearest to touching the questions

involved in this case are those on the question of whether
the school authorities have the right to exclusive control
over the list of studies to be taken by pupils in the public
schools or whether the parents have a limited right of
selection. The decisions on this question are in hopeless
conflict. In New Hampshire (Kidder v. Chelis, 59
N.H. 473); Indiana (State v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8
N.E. 708) and Iowa (State v. Mizner, 50 Ia. 145) it has been
held that the power of the public is exclusive, while in
with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either
that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its
requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. We
can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State's
interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to
the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
406 U.S. at 214-15.
" See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The right of parents to direct the education of their
children was specifically listed by the Scalia majority in Smith as one of the "hybrid"
situations, along with freedom of speech or press, which would permit the continued use
of fundamental rights analysis for free exercise claims. 494 U.S. at 881-882. If this
"hybrid rights" analysis was anything other than an effort, after the fact, to explain away
decisions which were otherwise inconsistent with the Court's new, governmentdeferential free exercise test, then its meaning is far from clear. The religious component
of the claim would appear to add nothing to the legal analysis, at least with respect to
freedom of press and speech cases. This is so because these are universally recognized as
independent, fundamental constitutional rights and therefore require use of the
"compelling interest" test even in the absence of any religious motivation. As will be
discussed below, the courts have not been quite so consistent in treating the right of
parents to control the upbringing and education of their children as fundamental and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny, but the inclusion of this right in the discussion of
hybrid rights in Smith, alongside these unchallenged First Amendment freedoms, clearly
supports the conclusion that it is also a fundamental right.

Illinois (School Trustees v. People, 87 Ill. 303); Oklahoma
(School Board District v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1); and
Wisconsin (Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59) some right of
control has been held to belong to the parent.
Landmark Briefs of the Supreme Court, at vol. 23, pp. 53-54.
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address the argument or
cases raised in the Governor's brief, the Pierce Court framed the issue in a
way that appears to implicate both parental rights and state authority
within the context of public education.
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
[other cites omitted], we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. As often heretofore pointed
out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State. The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 12
This passage not only declares that parents have an affirmative,
fundamental constitutional right to direct the education of their children; it
also contains the important pronouncement that states do not have the
power to standardize children. There can be no doubt that coercive
standardization was the goal of the Oregon law challenged in Pierce. As is
customary with laws enacted by voter initiative, an official statement by
the sponsors of the ballot measure was published to state its purposes and
goals. This statement said:
Do you believe in our public schools?
Do you believe they should have our full, complete and
loyal support?
What is the purpose of our public schools, and why should
we tax ourselves for their support?
Because they are the creators of true citizens by common
education, which teaches those ideals and standards upon
which our government rests.
12

268 U.S. at 534-35.

Our nation supports the public school for the sole purpose
of self-preservation.
The assimilation and education of our foreign born citizens
in the principles of our government, the hopes and
inspiration of our people, are best secured by and through
our public schools.
We must now halt those coming to our country from
forming groups, establishing schools, and thereby bringing
up their children in an environment often antagonistic to
the principles of our government.
Mix the children of the foreign-born with the native-born,
and the rich with the poor. Mix those with prejudices in the
public school melting pot for a few years while their minds
are plastic, and finally bring out the finished product -- a
true American.
The permanency of this nation rests in the education of its
youth in our public schools, where they will be correctly
instructed in the history of our country and the aims of our
government, and in those fundamental principles of
freedom and democracy, reverence and righteousness,
where all shall stand upon one common level.
When every parent in our land has a child in our public
schools, then and only then will there be a united interest in
the growth and higher efficiency of our public schools.
Our children must not under any pretext, be it based on
money, creed or social status, be divided into antagonistic
groups, there to absorb the narrow views of life, as they are
taught. If they are so divided, we will find our citizenship
composed and made up of cliques, cults and factions, each
striving, not for the good of the whole, but for the
supremacy of themselves. A divided school can no more
succeed than a divided nation.
Appendix B, Brief of Society of Sisters, Landmark Briefs of the Supreme
Court, at vol. 23, pp. 358-59.
In the late 1800s and at the beginning of this century, coercive
standardization of children was rejected by the Supreme Court in Pierce
and Meyer, dealing with efforts to bar or restrict private education, and by
the state supreme courts of California, Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska,

Oklahoma, Vermont and Wisconsin in the context of parents' rights to
"opt their children out" (to use a contemporary term) of certain public
school classes and programs. 13 In fact in Meyer, the Court seized the
occasion to denounce what may be properly understood as the intellectual
roots of the "it takes a village to raise a child" philosophy.
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato
suggested a law which should provide: "That the wives of
our guardians are to be common, and their children are to
be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor
any child his parent ....
The proper officers will take the
offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there
they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the
better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away
in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be." In
order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens,
Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and
intrusted their subsequent education and training to official
guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately
approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the
relation between individual and state were wholly different
from those upon which our institutions rest, and it hardly
will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such
restrictions upon the people of a state without14 doing
violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
At the time, it was the culturally conservative and religiously
Protestant elements of society that were generally aligned with the forces
of the coercive standardization of children. 15 Exceptionally hostile to the
world view of Catholic immigrants, outspoken supporters of this view
sought to use universal public education as a tool to create a homogenized,
Protestant society. The courts interposed the Constitution as a liberal -- as
that term has been classically defined -- bulwark against mandated
uniformity. As we shall see in the next section, the world has been turned
upside down. Conservatives and Protestants are the most frequent
protestors from the efforts inside public schools to coerce standardization
of children. Today's "liberals" and the courts have sided not with the
13 See Hardwick v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 205 P. 49 (1921) (including a shortper curiam

opinion of the California Supreme Court, en banc, concurring in the Court of Appeals'
decision); People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927); Trustees
of Schools v. People, 87 Ill. 303 (1877); Rulison v. Post, 79 I1. 567 (1875); State v.
School DistrictNo. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (1891); State v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63,
144 N.W. 1039 (1914); Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578
(1909); Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224 (1859); Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874).
14 262 U.S. at 401-02.
15Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years
Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1194, 1196-1200 (1997).

historical understanding of the Constitution, but with the ideology of Plato
and Sparta.
Indeed, The Rights of Public School Parents Are Rapidly Becoming
Extinct
The right of parents to choose alternatives for their own children inside
the public schools was frequently recognized until relatively recently. The
early cases, as a general rule, did not mention the United States
Constitution at all; they were simply based on common-law rights of
parents.
In California, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Appeals decision
holding that parents opposed to dancing could keep their children out of
dance classes in the public schools.' 6 The Court of Appeals stated:
Has the state the right to enact a law or confer upon any
public authorities a power the effect of which would be to
alienate in a measure the children from parental authority?
May the parents thus be eliminated in any measure from
consideration in the matter of the discipline and education
of their children along lines looking to the building up of
the personal character and the advancement of the personal
welfare of the latter?...
Indeed, it would be distinctively revolutionary and possibly
subversive of that home life so essential to the safety and
security of society and the government which regulates it,
the very opposite effect of what the public school system is
designed to accomplish, to hold that any such overreaching
7
power existed in the state or any of its agencies.'
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a public school must honor a
parent's request to exempt his child from an otherwise mandatory
bookkeeping class, 18 saying:
Law-givers in all free countries ... have deemed it wise to

leave the education and nurture of the children of the State
to the direction of the parent or guardian. This is, and has
ever been, the spirit of our free institutions. The State has
provided ...

a common school education, but leaves it to

parents and guardians to determine the extent to which they
9
will render it available to the children under their charge. '

16

17

Hardwick v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 205 P. 49, 54 (1921).
Id. at 54.

18

Rulison v. Post, 79 11. 567 (1875).

19

Id. at 573.

In a consistent ruling, just two years later this same court required a
public high school to admit a student who, in accordance with his father's
wishes, had not studied grammar at the level otherwise required for such
admission. 20 The court based its decision on the fact that all taxpayers pay
for the public schools; therefore, each taxpayer should be free to choose
his child's curriculum:
Every tax payer contributes to its maintenance, and there
should be no arbitrary regulation to prohibit the enjoyment
of its benefits, in equal degree by all....
. . . . The powers and duties of the trustees being . . . to
decide what branches of study shall be taught in the high
school, what text-books shall be used, and to prescribe
necessary rules and regulations for the management and
government of the school, but not to decide what particular
branches of study, of those
decided to be taught, shall be
21
pursued by each pupil.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also ordered the enrollment of a student
whose father asked that she be excused from studying grammar, saying:
Now, who is to determine what studies she shall pursue in school, -- a
teacher who has a mere temporary interest in her welfare, or her father,
who may reasonably be supposed to be desirous of pursuing such course
as will best promote the happiness of his child? The father certainly
possesses superior opportunities of knowing the physical and mental
capabilities of his child.2 2
The Supreme Courts of Oklahoma and Wisconsin upheld the rights of
parents to exempt their children from classes in singing2 3 and geography,2 4
respectively, with the latter court saying:
And how it will result disastrously to the proper discipline,
efficiency and well being of the common schools, to
concede this paramount right to the parent to make a
reasonable choice from the studies in the prescribed course
which his child shall pursue, is a proposition we cannot
understand....
But these powers and duties [of the school board] can be
well fulfilled without denying to the
parent all right to
25
children.
his
of
education
the
control
20 See, e.g., Trustees of Schs. v. People, 87 I1. 303 (1877).
21

1d. at 306-07 (emphasis added).

22See, e.g., State v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393, 395 (1891).

23 See Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578 (1909).
24 See Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874).
25
1d. at 66.

As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in its recent decision upholding
the Milwaukee school choice plan:
This conclusion is not inconsistent with Wisconsin tradition
or with past precedent of this court. Wisconsin has
traditionally accorded parents the primary role in decisions
regarding the education and upbringing of their children.
See, e.g., Yoder; Wisconsin Indus. Sch. for Girls v. Clark
County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N.W. 422 (1899); accordPierce;
Meyer. This court has embraced this principle for nearly a
century, recognizing that: "parents as the natural guardians
of their children [are] the persons under natural conditions
having the most effective motives and inclinations and
being in the best position and under the strongest
obligations to give to such children proper nurture,
education, and training." Wisconsin Indus. Sch. For Girls,
103 Wis. at 668-69, 79 N.W. 422.
Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602, 621 (1998)
[internal citations edited].
In Vermont, the Supreme Court rejected a student's request,
unsupported by his parents, to be excused from writing compositions in
school, but did so based upon the trial court's finding "that if the father of
the plaintiff had requested the teacher not to require the plaintiff
to write
26
compositions, he would have been excused therefrom .... ,"
Perhaps the most significant of these early state-court cases, decided
just two years after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pierce,
was the Colorado case of People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276,
255 P. 610 (1927). The Vollmar case, in a fascinating preview of the
1960s "school prayer" decisions, dealt with a state law requiring the daily
reading of the King James Version of the Bible in public school
classrooms. The plaintiffs were staunch Roman Catholics who believed
that the King James Version was an incomplete and inaccurate translation
of Scripture, and that it was harmful for anyone to read the Bible without
explanation by a priest or authorized teacher. The court noted that parents
have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment "to have their children
27
taught where, when, how, what, and by whom they may judge best,"
citing Meyer and Pierce, and therefore held "that the right of the parents to
select, within limits, what their children shall learn, is one of the liberties
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the national Constitution,
and of which, therefore, no state can deprive them." 28 The public school

26 Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224, 226-27 (1859).
27 People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 255 P. 610, 613 (1927).
28

255 P. at 613-614.

Bible-reading program was permitted to continue,
but objecting parents
29
children.
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an
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From the 1930s through the 1960s, few cases focused on the issue of
parents' rights. However, giving it at least passing mention was the 1944
case of Prince v. Massachusetts,30 which involved the street-corner sale of
religious publications by a young Jehovah's Witness. Here, the Court held
that the Constitution did not prohibit a state from regulating this type of
"child labor" even against the wishes of the child's guardian, but made a
point of reaffirming the importance of the Pierce doctrine of parents'
rights in less commercial contexts. 3 1 The overall lack of case law during
this period may be attributed to a number of factors, including a general
acceptance of the rights of private schools, the virtual non-existence of
home education as an option, and a nearly-universal public consensus that
the generic Protestant world view of the public schools was not only
acceptable but desirable.
In sharp contrast to the earlier cases, in those of the 1970s, 1980s and
1990s, proponents of parents' rights found themselves faring very poorly
in the public education context. Part of the problem was uncertainty on the
part of the courts as to whether the right enunciated in Pierce should be
protected, under contemporary Fourteenth Amendment terminology, as a
"fundamental right" requiring the highest protection of strict scrutiny, or
only as a general "liberty interest" which could be defeated by a
government showing of "rational basis." A recent discussion by the Fourth
Circuit points to this analytical difficulty.
Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige32 all use the language of
rational relationship review. But all three were decided
before the Court developed the current tiered framework -when it used only the "traditional" standard of scrutiny -- so
they provide no dispositive guidance on which standard
applies. Strict scrutiny of infringements on fundamental
rights was first suggested in 1961. And it was not expressly
embraced by a majority of the Court until 1971.

29

But see State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N.E. 708, 713 (1886); State v.

Mizner, 50 Iowa 145, 152 (1878); Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.H. 473, 476 (1879). (There

were cases from a smaller number of jurisdictions suggesting that parents do not have the
right to remove their children from offensive public school classes, so in those
jurisdictions a parent might have faced a choice like that which usually applies today:
permitting the child to take the class, or removing the child from the public schools
entirely.).
30 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
31 See cases cited supra note 9.
32 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), (involving the right of foreign-language
schools to exist in the Territory of Hawaii).

The Court came close to deciding which standard protects
parental rights in education in Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which
it overturned convictions of Amish parents for removing
their children from school before age sixteen ....

406 U.S.

205, 207, 234. Because religious concerns were central to
the Yoder petitioners' position, the Court did not decide
specifically whether the parental rights standing alone, in
nonreligious contexts, are "fundamental" in the
constitutional
sense, or whether heightened scrutiny
33
applies.

34
In the absence of such an interpretation from the Supreme Court,
many lower courts have decided that the right of parents to control their
children's education, especially in the public school context, is merely a
low-level "liberty interest" that can be overcome by a public school's
showing that its rules are not irrational. Indeed, the public schools have
overcome parents' interests in most of these cases, and overcome them
with a vengeance. Adding fuel to the funeral pyre of parents' rights has
been the fact that the majority of the families seeking relief from school
policies and practices have been conservative, born-again Christians, a
group whose sincere religious beliefs have not elicited strong expressions
of empathy or support from many school officials or judges.

Courts' reasons for denying parents' rights in public schools have
varied. It is almost impossible, in the absence of an obvious Establishment
Clause violation, for parents to cause the complete removal of offensive
materials from the public school curriculum. Even the parents in the
Supreme Court's landmark Pierce and Yoder decisions did not seek to
change public education generally, but only to exempt their own children
from some of its rules. Yielding relatively certain victory for the states,
33 Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education, 89 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir.

1996) (citations and internal quotations deleted); see also, Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer
Productions, 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995) ("the Meyer and Pierce cases were decided
well before the current "right to privacy" jurisprudence was developed, and the Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether the right to direct the upbringing and education of one's
children is among those fundamental rights whose infringement merits heightened
scrutiny
....
34

).

See n. 11, supra, and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Herndon, supra note 35, at 179; Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 73
F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996); Kampfer v. Gokey, 955 F. Supp. 167, 171-172 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) ("[T]he right to privacy encompasses some activities of child rearing and
education. However, those rights are strictly limited." The Court found that a parents'
rights claim did not even raise a justiciable federal claim so as to sustain subject matter
jurisdiction.). Compare People v. DeJonge, 442 Mich. 266, 501 N.W.2d 127, 134 (1993)
(combination of parents' rights and free exercise rights requires strict scrutiny as a
fundamental right under Smith) with People v. Bennett, 442 Mich. 316, 501 N.W.2d 106,
112-116 (1993) (parents rights without religion claim are not fundamental; require only
rational basis test). Outside the public school context, these two preceding cases were
decided by the Michigan Supreme Court on the same day.

are those cases in which parents already have an opt-out right, but seek to
limit the programs or materials to which other parents' children will be
exposed. 36
Even where the parents' request was not for a general change to the
public school program, but only an opt-out for their children, courts have
found a variety of reasons for denying them. Some courts hold that the
right of parents to control the education of their children is a nonfundamental liberty interest, so "rational basis" scrutiny applies and, in
practical effect, the government always wins. 37 A number of courts have
ruled that if there is no "coercion" or "compulsion" on the student, neither
parents' rights nor free exercise rights are even implicated.3 8 Even if one
assumes that this principle has some arguable applicability in the cases
where an effective opt-out exists, 39 it is frightening to discover that it has
been used as a justification supporting public school programs of
questionable educational value. According to the court, although offensive
to the students and their parents, such programs, for which no opt-out is
available, "only" force children to read and discuss offensive materials,
40
without "coercing" them to believe the truth of those materials!
Obviously, if this is all that the concept of "coercion" means, it offers no
help at all to students and parents.
The Sixth Circuit's Mozert decision 4 ' is particularly troublesome.
There, thirteen students were expelled or suspended from public schools
for refusing to read textbooks that both the students and their parents
claimed violated their religious beliefs. In fact, the school district
stipulated that the books did indeed contravene the religious beliefs held
by both the parents and students.
During deposition, the Superintendent of Hawkins County Public
Schools was asked whether he thought it was better for children to be
allowed be exempted from reading texts that were religiously offensive, or
to be forced to read such books while "kicking and screaming." He replied
that he thought that kicking and screaming would be better for the
36 See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985); Florey v. Sioux

Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314
F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970);
Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 124
Cal. Rptr. 68 (1st Dist. 1975).
37 See, e.g., text accompanying note
36.
38 See Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 1994);
Curtis
v. Sch. Comm., 420 Mass. 749, 652 N.E.2d 580, 586-587 (1995).
39
See generally note 36.
40 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987); Ware v.
Valley Stream High School Dist., 545 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (App. Div. 1989).
41 Mozert, note 42.
42 It is appropriate to disclose that the lead author of this article was also lead counsel for
the parents and students who were the plaintiffs in Mozert.

students, and that reading material that violated
their religious convictions
43
self-discipline.
and
character
build
would
Decisions such as Mozert are difficult to reconcile with the zealous
protection granted to students who object to religious observances in
public schools which they or their parents find offensive. 44 In the minds of
religious parents, at least, the coercion faced by their children when
confronted with the alternatives of reading religiously offensive texts or
being expelled from school is at least as great as that of a "coercive"
moment of silence from which objecting students in Alabama were
protected5 after being told that prayers could be offered during the
4
silence.

Other courts find that the government's "compelling interest" in seeing
that students receive an education gives public schools justification to
override parents' rights in almost any context, even if those rights are
"fundamental., 46 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held in Brown, in one of the most outrageous of the modem cases, that
parents do not have the right "to dictate the curriculum at the public
school to which they have chosen to send their children ' '47 -- even though
the parents' requested "dictatorial" action was merely excusing their own
children from a sexually explicit assembly -- and suggested that parents'
rights were not violated because, unlike in Yoder, they could not show that
the school's action "threatened their entire way of life., 48 This is truly an
extreme standard by any measure.
One federal district court suggested that providing an opt-out for
students whose religious beliefs were infringed by school programs would
violate the Establishment Clause,49 and stated that because the children
were young, they probably would not notice that their family's religious

43 Brief of Appellees at 76, Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 765 F.2d 75 (6 tb

Cir. 1985) (No. 84-5317) (citing the deposition of Bill Snodgrass).
44 See supra, n.8 (a). This discussion should not be read as an endorsement of the "school
prayer movement" by the authors of this article. Precisely because the authors object to
coercion of conscience, they are deeply troubled by many proposals to restore prayer
services or classroom devotional exercises to the public schools.

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Fleischfresser, supra note 40, at 690; Ware, supra note 42, at 320-21; Citizens for
Parental Rights, supra note 38, at 83. This, of course, is in stark contrast to the normal
constitutional rule that the "compelling interest" test, if it applies, requires the
government to show such an imperative interest not merely at the general level, but with
regard to its refusal to exempt a sincere religious believer from the specific requirement
in question. See Yoder, supra note 9, at 221.
45
46

47 68 F.3d at 533.
48
1 d. at 539.
49 Davis v. Page, 385

F. Supp. 395,401 (D.N.H. 1974).

convictions were being violated anyway. 50 Another federal trial court

seemed quite perplexed by the "novel" notion that parents have a
fundamental right to control the education of their children. 51 One way or
another, nearly all of the federal and state courts that have considered
parents' rights in the public school context in the last thirty years
have
52
come to the same sobering conclusion: schools win; parents lose.
The Relative Safety of Private and Home Education

In contrast with the dismal record of parents' rights cases in the public
school context, the rights of parents in the realm of private schooling and
home schooling have been vindicated and protected to ever-increasing
levels with the passage of time. In the early 1980s, as the modern home
education era was just beginning, most of the states had very restrictive
home school laws. Common provisions included teacher degree and
certification requirements, extensive mandated reporting, frequent
standardized testing, unbridled discretion of local school officials to
approve or deny the right to home school, and even mandatory return of
children to the public school system if certain conditions were not met.
Notably, most of that has changed in the past fifteen years.
The litigation record has not been a uniform success, as will be
demonstrated below. The courts' confusion over and erosion of the
fundamental rights enunciated in Pierce and Yoder have impacted
decisions in the area of private and home schools as well as public
schools. However, with regard to home education, the obvious equity and

common sense of permitting parents to teach their own children with
minimal government interference is sufficiently powerful that, even in
those cases where the courts have ruled against home schoolers' rights,
legislative changes to protect those rights have consistently occurred
shortly thereafter. Thus, there has been a steady march of court or
legislative victories for home schoolers.
50 Id. at 405 ("The Davis children are very young. It is difficult to argue or believe that

they are presently aware of the distinction between worldly and spiritual music. If they
can hear music with their parents, then they can hear music in the schools.").
" See Cornwell, supra note 38, at 342 ("No authority is cited in support of this novel
proposition, and this Court knows of no such constitutional right.").
52 The list of cases with the opposite result is quite short. In Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d
797 (6th Cir. 1972), a student with religious objections to military service was allowed to
opt out of mandatory ROTC training in a public high school. The court noted that
alternate physical education facilities were available only 100 yards away from the
school. In Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979), students were exempted
from mandatory physical education classes because of their religious objections to
"immodest apparel." Finally, in Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div.
1993), parents were permitted to opt their children out of a public school condom
distribution program, but only because the court interpreted the program to involve the
provision of health services rather than mere exposure "to ideas or a point of view with
which they disagree or find offensive." 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266.

" In 1983, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that that state's
compulsory attendance law was "void for vagueness insofar as it
fails to define a private school." Wisconsin v. Popanz, 112 Wis.
2d 166, 332 N.W.2d 750, 756. The Wisconsin legislature
followed up that ruling with a new home school statute. Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 115.001(3g) (1997).
" The Supreme Court of Georgia found Georgia's compulsory
attendance law to be "unconstitutionally vague" as applied to
home schoolers in 1983. Roemhild v. Georgia, 251 Ga. 569, 308
S.E.2d 154, 159. The Georgia Legislature responded by enacting
a home school statute that same year. Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2690(c) (1998).
" The Virginia Supreme Court, by contrast, ruled against home
schoolers. Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d
799 (1982). The Virginia legislature responded by enacting a
home school statute in 1984. Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-254.1
(1998).
" Similarly, Florida's intermediate court of appeals ruled against
home educators in State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985), but the Florida legislature responded promptly
by enacting a home school statute. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.02(4)
(1997).
" In 1983, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico ruled against
home schoolers. State v. Edgington, 99 N.M. 715, 663 P.2d 374
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983). In 1985, the New Mexico legislature
legalized home schooling. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-2(V) (1998).
" Then-Governor William Jefferson Clinton signed a new
Arkansas home school statute in 1985 (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 6-15501 (1997)), which followed a negative decision by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Burrow v. Arkansas, 282 Ark. 479, 669
S.W.2d 441 (1984).
" Two federal district courts struck down Missouri's compulsory
attendance law as applied to home schoolers, one holding that
"this statute represents a prime example of legislation which
yields an unacceptable amount of discretion to officials charged
with its enforcement." Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379, 381
(E.D. Mo. 1985). The Missouri legislature responded by
enacting a home school statute in 1986. Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 167.031(2) (1997).
" The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota's
requirement that private and home school teachers have
qualifications "essentially equivalent" to public school teachers
was too vague to serve as a basis for criminal conviction, and
therefore was an unconstitutional violation of due process. State
v. Newstrom, 371 N.W. 2d 525, 533 (Minn. 1985). The

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

Minnesota legislature responded by enacting a home school
statute in 1987. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 120.101 (1997).
A federal district court ruled against home schoolers in New
York, Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y.
1988), but the very next day the New York Board of Regents
issued regulations authorizing home education. New York
Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations, Title 8, §
100.10 (1997).
North Carolina was permitted by the Fourth Circuit to prosecute
home schoolers in Duro v. DistrictAttorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th
Cir. 1983), but the North Carolina legislature enacted a new
home school statute in 1988. N.C. Gen. Stat., §§ 115C-547
through 115C-565 (1997).
In 1987, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found
home education to be constitutionally protected, and the Court
created guidelines and procedures to ensure the rights of parents
to educate their own children in their own homes. Care and
Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass.
1987).
A federal district court ruled the Pennsylvania statute to be
unconstitutionally vague in Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp.
516 (M.D. Pa. 1988). The Pennsylvania legislature unanimously
enacted a new home school statute later that same year. Pa. Stat.
Ann. Title 24, § 13-1327.1 (1997).
The North Dakota Supreme Court refused to recognize a parent's
right to educate a child at home in seven different cases, 53 but
the North Dakota legislature finally enacted a home school
statute in 1989. N.D. Cent. Code § 15-34.1-06 (1997).
When the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ruled against home
schoolers in 1988, Blount v. Dept. of Educational and Cultural
Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988), the Maine legislature
responded by legalizing home schooling. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.,
Title 20-A, § 5001-A(3)(A)(3) (1997).
When the Ohio Supreme Court ruled against the Schmidt family
in Ohio v. Schmidt, 29 Ohio St. 3d 32, 505 N.E.2d 627 (1987),
the Ohio State Board of Education responded by legalizing home
schooling in 1989. Ohio Admin. Code §§ 3301-34-01 to 330134-06 (1998).
The New Hampshire Department of Education attempted to
triple the regulations on home schoolers in 1989, and the New
Hampshire legislature responded by legalizing home schooling
in 1990. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-A (1997).

53 See Birst v. Sanstead, 493 N.W.2d 690 (N.D. 1992); Van Inwagen v. Sanstead, 440

N.W.2d 513 (N.D. 1989); State v. Toman, 436 N.W.2d 10 (N.D. 1989); State v. Dagley,
430 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1988); State v. Melin, 428 N.W.2d 227 (N.D. 1988); State v.
Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1988); State v. Lund, 424 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1988).

" Lower Iowa courts had convicted a number of home schoolers,
but the Iowa legislature recognized the right to home school in
1991. Iowa Code Ann. §§ 299A.1 through 299A.10 (1997).
" Home schoolers in Tennessee lost in the trial court and the state
court of appeals in Crites v. Smith, 826 S.W.2d 459 (1991), but
the Tennessee legislature responded by amending the home
school statute in 1994, giving virtually the same relief requested
in that case -- and more. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-3050 (1997).
" In 1991, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Lawrence v. State
Board of Education, 306 S.C. 368, 412 S.E.2d 394 (1991),
struck down a state law requiring parents to pass a teachers' test.
The legislature amended South Carolina Code § 59-65-45 in
1992.
" Michigan was notorious for prosecuting and convicting home
schoolers, and lower courts had ruled in every case against the
DeJonge family, but the Michigan Supreme Court finally
recognized a religious liberty right to home school in People v.
DeJonge, 442 Mich. 266, 501 N.W.2d 127 (1993). On the same
day, however, the Court denied such a liberty to non-religious
home schoolers. People v. Bennett, 442 Mich. 316, 501 N.W.2d
106 (1993).
The Michigan legislature corrected this
inconsistency by extending the right to all home educators in
1996. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1561(3)(f) (1997).
Following this article is an Appendix summarizing the state laws
governing home education in each of the fifty states. Parents throughout
the United States now enjoy the right to home school, and in most
jurisdictions the restrictions that remain are at most a nuisance rather than
a real impediment to home education.
Conclusion
The presence of a safe harbor for parents' rights -- in private schools
and, especially, in home schools -- makes public school antagonism to the
legitimate concerns of parents especially unpalatable. Ongoing efforts to
close this safe harbor by repressing home schooling will not work
politically, and will not eliminate the desire that inherently bums in the
hearts of parents to see their children raised and educated in a way that
conforms with their fundamental values and beliefs, without governmentimposed homogenization.
A thorough examination of the constitutional status of school choice is
beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, it is enough to state
categorically that the battle has been won. The Supreme Court's recent

Establishment Clause decisions 54 leave no room for serious doubt on the
proposition that a properly structured voucher or school choice plan that
allows parents to decide where the educational dollars will be spent, with
no government coercion either in favor of or in opposition to schools with
various traditional and non-traditional religious world views, is clearly
constitutional. There are a few anti-school-choice advocates who continue
to proclaim loudly that this is an open question that could be resolved by
the Court against the constitutionality of non-discriminatory school
funding, but their arguments are based on wishful thinking rather than
analysis. 55 The availability of school choice programs -- allowing parents
to direct not only their children but also their tax dollars into private and
home schools -- is now only a matter of time and political will.56 Parents
who continue to be frustrated over their inability to have any effective
voice in their children's education -- their inability even to maintain such
minimal control as the right to opt their children out of offensive
assemblies with sexually explicit content 57 -- will have ever-increasing
opportunities to "vote with their feet" by taking their children and their
resources elsewhere.
Moreover, as has been established time and time again by studies and
analysis,

58

parental involvement is the key to educational success. Parents

must remain involved on terms that enable them to be willing participants,
not unwilling captives.
If public schools care about children, about keeping them in the public
schools and about providing them with the best possible educational
opportunities, they will have to begin treating parents with greater respect
and far greater concern for their rights and legitimate interests. The elitist
"we're the professional educators so we know what's best" attitude must
become a thing of the past. Teachers and school administrators need to
54 See, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services,

474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
55 Even many opponents of school choice, and commentators who harbor doubts about its
wisdom, have come to realize that the federal constitutional battle is over. See, Dr. Frank
Kemerer, Regents Professor of Education Law and Administration, University of North
Texas, Constitutionality of School Vouchers, paper presented at the 43rd Annual
Conference of the Education Law Association, Seattle, Washington, Nov. 20-22, 1997.
See also Education Law Association, supra, n.3. ("In sum, it appears that a majority [of
the Supreme Court] will uphold against an Establishment Clause challenge a publiclyfunded voucher program that channels money to parents and gives them a wide variety of

public and private schools, including those that are sectarian, from which to choose.").
56 However, many advocates for private and home schools, including the authors
of this
article, have expressed strong policy reservations about vouchers because of the
likelihood that government dollars will come with government regulatory strings
attached. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Tax credits are clearly the
more
desirable vehicle for school choice.
57
See Brown, 68 F.3d at 525.

58

Brown, supra note 6, at 534.

bring parents back into the heart of educational decision-making, even if
the courts continue to grant schools the pyrrhic victories that they seek,
defying common sense and the longstanding common-law and
constitutional principles of parents' rights.
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